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The Shattered Mirror:
Identity, Authority, and Law
Lawrence M. Friedman*
At Stanford Law School, there are a stunning number of student organiza-
tions. Some of them have been around for a while. Others come and go. We
have or have had organizations of black students, Hispanic students, Native
American students, Asian and Pacific Islander students, gay and lesbian
students, Jewish students, Christian students, women students, older students,
students interested in high technology, students interested in entertainment
law. Most of these groups are identity groups. A few are groups organized
around some field of law. When I went to law school, almost fifty years ago,
there were (ifI am remembering correctly) none of these organizations. To be
sure, there were very few women or minority students in law school at that
time.
It is no great mystery why so many such organizations can be found in
law schools today, almost everybody would connect them with the rise of
identity politics. For many people, identity politics itself is a serious national
problem. Identity politics, they fear, shatters the unity of the country. There
are far too many of these groups, each of them apparently demanding a place
in the sun, a share in the stock of power and legitimacy. If we grant their
claims, what will be left ofnational identity in the United States? What is the
nation, or, is there any actual nation any more? Indeed, sometimes it seems
as if the nation has disintegrated, and given way to a multiplicity of nations
inside the historic borders ofthe actual nation. In a sense, each identity group
forms a kind of nation and indeed, the very word "nation" is used. We have
all heard of the Nation of Islam. A gay activist group calls itself the Queer
Nation. There are even gangs that call themselves nations. It would not be
farfetched to talk about the feminist nation or the Hispanic nation, or the
nation of the blind or the deaf. In many countries, ethnic minorities, living in
compact areas - the French speakers in Canada, for example - do constitute
sub-nations within a larger nation, in a quite literal sense. But in the United
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States, the internal nations do not live in geographically compact areas. They
are everywhere and nowhere.
Before I go any further, I want to make clear the thesis of my speech. It
is a story of a rise and a fall. The rise is the rise of a new concept of equality,
which I call plural equality. The fall is the fall of a regime of cultural domi-
nance. My thesis is that once upon a time there was a real cultural ruling class
in this country. This period lasted roughly through the middle of the twentieth
century. Gradually, slowly, its position was eroded. Today, there is a much
more complex cultural and moral landscape; this is the situation I call plural
equality. The metaphor of a mirror can be used to describe the earlier state of
affairs - smooth, uniform, glassy. But the mirror has now shattered, and can-
not be put together again.
I will describe briefly a few aspects of this story which, as you canimagine, is quite complicated. I will then try to connect the thesis to other
developments in American culture, law, and life.
I will begin with a California case from 1931 - Melvin v. Reid. This was
a right of privacy case. The plaintiff was a woman whose original name was
Gabrielle Darley. She had led a colorful life. She came from a small town, and
fell in love with an evil stranger, Howard, who lured her to New Orleans,
where he put her to work as a prostitute in the red-light district. Howard then
double-crossed and abandoned her; she followed him to Los Angeles, where
he was about to marry another woman. There she killed him. She was arrested
and tried, but the jury acquitted her. This all took place in 1917 and 1918.2
Gabrielle then "abandoned her life of shame," married a man named Bernard
Melvin, and began to live what the court described as a "righteous" life, earn-
ing herself a place in "respectable society."' Her new friends did not know
about her scarlet past. But in 1925, a movie called The RedKimono told the
story ofthe life of Gabrielle Darley - and it used her real name. Her cover had
been blown. She brought a lawsuit against the movie-makers.4
The appellate court upheld her suit and expressed a sense of outrage at
what the defendants had done to her.' It was wrong to destroy Gabrielle's
reputation - wrong to injure her standing in society by publishing the "story
ofher former depravity" for the sole purpose of making money.6 Society, said
the court solemnly, had a duty to "lift up and sustain the unfortunate," not to
1. 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
2. This information, and information about the movie, comes from Russell Campbell,
'Fallen Woman" Prostitute Narratives in the Cinema, at httpJ/www.latrobe.edu.au/www/
screeningthepast/firstrelease/frl 199/refr8bhlm (uploaded November 12,1999).
3. Id.
4. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct- App. 1931).
5. Id. at 93-94.
6. Id. at 93.
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tear the unfortunate down.' The court was clearly on Gabrielle's side; the
legal basis of the decision was, fiankly, somewhat flimsy. Rummaging about
for a legal argument - anything at all - the court found a provision of the
California Constitution which guaranteed the right to "pursue and obtain
happiness."" That would do the trick; it was "immaterial" whether one called
this right a "right of privacy."19 The right to happiness, right there in the
California Constitution, allowed Gabrielle to bring this particular suit.
Although the court said the right of privacy was "immaterial," it was in
fact the foundation of Gabrielle's claim. As most law students learn in their
torts class, the right of privacy owes a lot to a famous law review article,
written by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis and published in the
Harvard Law Review in 1890.10 In this article, Brandeis and Warren argued
that the common law should protect "privacy";" in fact, there were already
tools to do so in the armory of the common law. 2 A right of privacy, they
said, was necessary because the press was "overstepping... the obvious
bounds of... decency."'3 Gossip had become a business. 4 This was, of
course, the age of the yellow press - sensational cheap newspapers, full of
news of crime, divorce, and scandal. It was also the age of the Kodak, the
first "candid camera," as Robert Mensel has pointed out.'5 Before this,
nobody could take your picture without your permission. You had to sit still
to pose because cameras were slow on the draw. Now, with fast cameras, it
was possible for somebody to steal your image without your permission -
perhaps without your even knowing it.16 Thus, the early history of the "right
of privacy" was at least in part a reaction to technology - a technology that
threatened respectability. Warren and Brandeis, like the California court forty
years later, assumed a certain code of morality, a certain bourgeois way of
life, which, they also assumed, had pride of place in the American cultural
scene and deserved legal protection.
Another emerging technology that posed a threat to the established order
was the motion picture. Movies came into prominence in the early twentieth
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 93-94.
10. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
11. Id. at 195-96.
12. Id. at 197-214.
13. Id. at 196.
14. Id.
15. Robert E. Mensel, "Kodakers Lying in Wait': Amateur Photography and the Right
ofPrivacy in New York 1885-1915,43 AM. Q. 24 (1991).
16. Id. at 31.
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century. In very short order, there were nickelodeons in every city. This new
and marvelous form of entertainment attracted masses of people.
Very early, too, there were attempts to censor the movies. Under a 1907
Chicago ordinance, no movie could be shown without a permit from the chief
of police; the permit was not to be granted to "obscene or immoral" movies.17
The chief turned down two movies, The James Boys, and Night Riders; this
was the occasion for testing the validity of the ordinance. 18 In Block v. City of
Chicago, the Illinois Supreme Court heldthe ordinance constitutional. 19 Movie
theaters were cheap. They attracted not only children, but people of "limited
means," people who did not "attend the production of plays and dramas given
in the regular theatres."2 These were "those classes whose age, education and
situation in life specially entitle them to protection against the evil influence
of obscene and immoral representations."'21 The two movies in question failed
the test; they portrayed "exhibitions of crime."' In Night Riders, you could see
"malicious mischief, arson and murder."' The films were "immoral" and
could have "evil effects upon youthful spectators.1
24
This was not an isolated instance. The Pennsylvania Board of Censors,
created in 1911, had power to turn down films which would "debase or corrupt
the morals."  In Ohio, films which were "moral, educational or amusing and
harmless" were to be approved by the Ohio Board.26 Many cities, including
Detroit, Memphis, Atlanta, and Boston, had censorship boards oftheir own, for
the same general purposes. 7
The censorship issue reached the United States Supreme Court in 1915;
the case concerned the Ohio censorship law." The Court upheld the law.'
The opinion expressed the same philosophy as the Illinois Supreme Court.3"
Films were dangerous and seductive; they could be "used for evil."31 Movies,
17. Block v. City of Chic., 87 N.E. 1011, 1012-13 (11. 1909).
18. Id. at 1013.
19. Id. at 1016.
20. Id. at 1013.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1016.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. 1911 PA. LAWS 1067.
26. OHUO REV. CODEANN. § 871.49 (Anderson 1926).
27. RICHARD S. RANDALL, CENSORSHIP OF THE MovIEs: THE SOCIAL AND POUICAL
CONTROL OF A MASS MEDIuM 17 (1968).
28. Mut Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230,231 (1915).
29. Id. at 247.
30. Id. at242.
31. Id.
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potentially, could appeal to a "prurient interest. 32 The reasons censors gave
for turning down movies in those days seem incredible to the modem reader.
In 1925, the Chicago censors rejected a movie called Deadwood Coach be-
cause it had too much "gun-play."33 The Atlanta board said no to Lost Bound-
aries, a movie in which a black family passed for white.34 Clearly, the boards
went beyond conventional ideas of obscenity. They saw themselves as guard-
ians of the dominant morality - the bourgeois code. There was, of course, also
a strong strain ofelitism in all this. The masses could not be trusted; they were
like children. Their entertainments had to be vetted by their betters. It was a
mentality which allowed a publisher to printthe shocking works of the Marquis
de Sade, so long as the dirty stuff only appeared in French. The same combina-
tion of eltism, and a finm belief in the code of behavior ofthe majority, under-
lay the article by Warren and Brandeis, and the attitudes expressed in the Red
Kimono case.
Censorship boards saw themselves vested with the duty of defending and
upholding "traditional values." But these were not, of course, everybody's
values; they were hardly eternal verities. Rather, they were historically and
culturally specific. They were, in essence, the values and the morality of
white Protestant male America. I use this label not to cast aspersions on this
code, but as a simple statement of fact. And we must remember that many -
probably most - elements of that code were not particularly different from the
code of other people; you do not have to be a Lutheran or a Baptist to be
against murder or embezzlement. You also do not have to be a Presbyterian
to be against adultery. In fact, many ofthe new immigrant groups - Catholic,
Orthodox, or Jewish - insisted if anything even more enthusiastically that
respectable, decent women should be virgins until their wedding night. Yet
there were differences in detail about the definition of decent, respectable
behavior; these details could be, and in fact were, enormously important.
At one time, the old-American code was perhaps in fact the code of most
Americans - at least white adult male Americans. Challenges to that code were
understood as challenges to a whole structure - challenges to the dominance
of the old-American group. In general, the period until roughly the mid-
twentieth century was the heyday of what Milton Gordon has called anglo-
conformity.3" Americans were supposed to accept American values, that is, the
values of the majority. Newcomers were expected to assimilate, to learn to
speak English, to adopt American ways, to wave the flag, and to think Amer-
32. Id.
33. RANDAL, supra note 27, at 23-24.
34. Id. at 24.
35. See M ILTON. GORDoN,ASsIMILAnONINA.MERICANLPE: TIEROLEOFREUGION,
RAcE, AND NATIONAL ORIGINS 88 (1964).
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ican thoughts. 36 America was, to be sure, a melting pot. But this famous
metaphor meant different things to different people. Israel Zangwill, who first
used the phrase, was a Jewish immigrant to the United States. TheMeltingPot
was the title of a play Zangwill wrote in 1908. 31 For Zangwill, the melting pot
meant that a distinctive nationality would emerge from the fusion of different
cultures in the United States. Throw them all inthe pot, they melt together, and
out comes something new and wonderful.3 ' But to most Americans already in
the United States, the melting pot meant assimilation into the dominant culture.
It meant rejecting "hyphen-Americans" -that is, Italian-Americans, Armenian-
Americans, Hungarian-Americans and what not. These people were not to
retain a distinctive identity and culture.39 Rather, all of them would or should
disappear into the moral and cultural world ofthe dominant culture.
That dominant culture was a proud culture, proud of its achievements;
these achievements included freedom and a democratic way of life. The dom-
inant culture professed great tolerance for the strangers within American
gates. There was liberty and justice for all - people repeatedly intoned this
mantra or its equivalent. There were no political prisoners here (well, hardly
any). Religious tolerance was the norm. Nobody was burned at the stake in
America. There were no heretics, no witch hunts after the seventeenth cen-
tury. All religions were allowed (well, almost all).4" The message was: You
can build your churches and your synagogues and your mosques and Buddhist
temples; no problem.
Toleration? Yes, but toleration meant allowing. It did not mean glorify-
ing, or even sharing the invisible social cachet that majority status brings.4 1 It
was always clear in the United States which norms were dominant, which cul-
ture defined the true nation, which people actually owned the house of Amer-
ica, and which people were the tolerated guests. Most people in the nineteenth
century believed in legal and political equality, at least after a fashion. Prop-
erty qualifications were dismantled, and bythe middle of the century, it essen-
tially was true that all adult white males were entitled to vote, and that one
man's vote counted the same as any other man's. One man's dollar also bought
36. Id. at 100.
37. LAWRENcEM. FR]EDMAN, THEHoRizoNTALSOCWaE 171 (1999).
38. Id.
39. On the pressure to "Americanize," see generally GORDON, supra note 35.
40. Egregious exceptions werethe treatment ofthe LatterDay Saints, see generally EDWIn
BROWNFRMAGE &RiHARDCOIDNMANRUMZIONNTBECOURTS: ALEGALHISTORYOFTBE
CHURCHOFJESUS CHRIST OFLATrER-DAYSANTS, 1830-1900 (1988), and, atthe veryend ofthe
period, the Jehovah's Witnesses, see generally SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGI NG JEHOvAH'S
WrrNESsEs: REIGIOUS PERSECUTION AD THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2000).
41. And for racial minorities, as opposed to religious and ethnic minorities, there was
hardly even a pretense of equality.
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the same goods as another man's. The economy was relatively free and open;
states encouraged enterprise, regulation was light, and (with the enormous
exception of slavery) a free labor system was in effectthroughoutthe country.4"
Equality of honor, status, and position - social equality - was something else
again, even among white people. The United States was a very egalitarian
country, compared to England or the countries of the continent; but it was
nonetheless abundantly clear where high status belonged, and to whom it
belonged.
L A New Society
But at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, new forces were at work in society. These forces amounted to an assault
on traditional values, the traditional concept of equality, and the cultural dom-
inance of old-American morality.
Immigration was one factor unsettling the old order. Immigration brought
millions of new Americans into the country, and to a certain extent, it brought
with it a clash of cultures. For example, many ofthe newcomers from southern
and eastern Europe held different attitudes toward liquor and drinicng; they
liked their glass of wine, and the strong American culture of temperance was
foreign to them. Obviously, they were not alone; plenty of Americans drank,
and drank heavily. But intellectual, religious, and moral leaders condemned
drunkenness and the culture of the neighborhood saloon; they preached a
gospel of ternperance or abstinence. Throughout the nineteenth century, there
were spasms of revolt against liquor, and a significant "dry" movement made
its presence felt. Some states passed restrictive laws - the most famous of
these was the so-called "Maine Law," which began (obviously) in Maine in
185 L" As with movie censorship, and with privacy law, there was a certain
elitism about the temperance movement- daddies who should be putting bread
on the table and working hard were spending their time in drunken debauches
in saloons. But there was also a genuinely popular element to the temperance
movement. And some scholars have analyzed the whole temperance move-
ment interms of a clash of cultures. On one side was old-line, rural, Protestant
America; on the other side were the urban, Catholic newcomers. This clash of
cultures formed the background for the so-called noble experiment, Prohibi-
tion, which became law around 1920 and lasted a little more than a decade
before it was consigned to the ash-heap of history.
44
42. On the development of the modem free labor system, see generally ROBERT J. STEIN-
FELD,THBEINvENnoNoFFREELABoR: THE POYMEwTRELATIONINE GUSHANDAMEICAN
LAW AND CULTuRE, 1350-1870 (1991).
43. LAWRENCEM.FREDMAN,CRMEANDPmNmMET'NAMERICANHSTORY134 (1993).
44. JOSEPH GUSFIELD, SYMBOiC CRUSADE: STATUS POLICS AND THE AMERICAN
TEMPERANCE MOVEMENT (1963). On the background of Prohibition, see generally RICHARD F.
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The old culture was not just buffeted by newcomers; it was also decaying
among the children of old-Americans, as new ways ofthinking and new habits
developed. Thus, there was a clash of generations as well; the culture was
changing as Americans fled farms and towns for cities and suburbs. Cities
were exciting places, but they were also immoral places, sites of vice and of
danger. There were evil men in the city - many of them foreigners - who
preyed on girls like Gabrielle Darley, innocents from the farn country, and
brought these girls to "ruin." This image lay behind the passage of the Mann
Act, the famous "white slave law," that made it a crime to transport a woman
across state lines for "immoral" purposes.45
Many of the changes in society can be summed up as the development of
what I have elsewhere called the horizontal society.' The horizontal society
is modem society; it stands in contrast to traditional society. So-called '"tadi-
tional" society was certainly no monolith, but atthe core was a system in which
people lived relatively narrow, circumscribed lives, in family groups, and
typically in small villages. In these small, local communities, there was a clear
line of authority from top to bottom. Fathers generally were firmly in charge
of the family. Or, there might be a more complicated kinship arrangement,
with uncles, aunts, grandparents, or other relatives in positions of authority.
In a peasant village, there might be chiefs, lords, or religious leaders, outside
the family circle, but the population remained quite local. But in any event,
rights and duties were strictly regulated, by kinship, age, and position. People
generally stayed close to home. They were born into or grew into certain roles.
Sex, age, birth order, and position in society were more or less fixed items, and
they determined your place in society. Influences from the outside world came
in only slowly and rarely. In particular, the world of the child was limited to
the tight, vertical world of his family, his house, his little town.
In modem society, identity and authority are much more horizontal. New
tools of communication and transportation have developed. All this makes it
possible to spread ideas to like-minded people. It becomes feasible to mobi-
lize people, for a cause or an activity, even though they are not in face to face
contact - even though they are not neighbors or friends or members of the
same circle of acquaintance. Technology has conquered time and space. The
conquest of space does not mean putting a man on the moon. Nobody lives
on the moon. I refer rather to the conquest of space and time here on earth.
Jules Verne wrote Around the World in 80 Days, almost as science fiction.
Around the world now physically takes a day or even less. And it is much
HAMM, SHAPING THE 18TH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE REFORM LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE
POLITY, 1880-1920 (1995).
45. On the history and enforcement of the Mann Act, see DAVID J. LANGUKM, CROSSING
OVER THE LINE: LEISLATING MORAUTY AND THE MANNACT (1994).
46. FRIEDMAN, supra note 37.
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cheaper, too, than in Verne's days - with or without frequent flyer miles.
Pictures and words travel around the world much faster - I suppose in a
nanosecond - by way of computer satellite, or by way of e-mail, or even by
means of the now old-fashioned telephone.
In a horizontal world, people are much freer to form their own kinds of
relationships, and are more or less on a plane of equality. Sometimes this
equality is imaginary or exaggerated. Of course there still are strata in soci-
ety: higher and lower, richer and poorer, powerful and powerless. But
relatively speaking, the playing field is more level than in traditional society;
a person's position in society is not fixed once and for all by birth, or birth
order, or gender, or the like. There is, in the Western countries, tremendous
geographic mobility. Americans in particular seem unable to stay put. Even
when they do not make a permanent physical move - when they stay in the
same house - they may still indulge a passion for travel; they may take vaca-
tions in Bali or in Florence or in Nairobi. At one time, only the rich crossed
borders as tourists; now the whole middle class can go abroad. Social mobil-
ity, too, is a reality - to say that any child can grow up to be President is true,
though almost no child in fact will do so. But no child can grow up to be King
or Queen of England, unless that child had been born into the right kind of
family, of the right sex, and of the right birth order.
When I say contemporary society is relatively horizontal, it is important
to emphasize the word "relatively." The old vertical relationships are far from
dead. The family is still with us and perhaps always will be; I certainly hope
so. But it is not the same kind of family. Authority is with us too, but it has
flattened out considerably. Even in kindergarten, children are treated differ-
ently from the way they were treated in the past. Nobody in the nineteenth
century knew about the institution of "show and tell." It was all tell, and no
show; and the teacher did the telling. Nobody questions that daddy and
mommy are still the most important influences on a child; but in an age of TV,
images, ideas, nuances, and suggestions are beamed at the child's brain from
outside, almost from the very beginning of life. Relationships between parents
and children are, necessarily, not the same as they were before. Nor are rela-
tionships between husbands and wives the same - or relationships between
leaders and followers.47
In the world of the horizontal society, there is much more freedom to
choose an identity, to choose an aspect of the self and make it the center of
gravity in one's own life. For example, a man might become a passionate
collector of old bottles. He goes to clubs, goes to conventions, meets other
bottle collectors. Maybe he makes bottle collecting his whole world. He reads
47. It also is true that many people choose, voluntarily for the most part, to enter into new
vertical relationships - with a gum or leader, for example. But these are not ascribed relation-
ships.
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books about it; he chats with other collectors onthe Internet. His relationship
with other bottle collectors, and the world of bottle collecting, basically is
horizontal; these relationships are sharply different from the intense, vertical,
authoritarian relationships he had as a child with his mother and father. And
bottle-collecting is something he chose for himself. Nobody is born a bottle
collector. There is no bottle collecting gene; ifthere is, nobodyhas found it yet.
Bottle collectors do not make much of a difference to the world. I took
this example, though, because it is so obviously horizontal and so obviously
voluntary - a matter of choice. And it is based on communication; it depends
on finding, and reaching, like-minded people. Ways of communicating, and
opportunities to communicate, change the very nature of society in drastic
ways; they change the way people relate to each other. In traditional society,
people related to each other in narrow circles. In small societies- for example,
on some tiny atoll - everybody knows everybody else by name and by sight;
everybody knows everybody inside that society, and nobody at all outside of
it. Life today is lived in concentric circles, bigger and bigger circles: your
family circle, then your work circle, the circle of other people who share
interests or experiences, and so on. The circles that are furthest away may be
dim, hardly experienced, like the orbit of Pluto, but they are nonetheless there.
And you can, very often, choose to move to that further circle, and stake a
claim there for yourself The bottle collector circle is of this type.
This ability to move from one circle to another, further and further from
"home," as it were, is extremely important. We can move out into the world -
literally - when we travel. By the same token, even if we stay put, the world
comes to us: on TV, in the movies, and now through the Internet. That this
facilitates the spread of mass culture is obvious. Ideas, fashions, and trends
once took centuries to diffuse around the world. Then they took years; then
months; then days. Now, it seems as if they take minutes. Borders are not
barriers to cultural diffusion. They are incredibly porous. You can build a
fence against people, but you cannot fence out modernity - though some
countries try, either in a thoroughgoing way (Iran would be an example), or
selectively, like France, or Canada. Inside the United States, state borders
mean nothing culturally, if they ever did. Very likely, regionalism is on the
decline inthe United States. Everybody watches the same TV shows, sings the
same songs, wears the same clothes. Some of the small enclaves, like the
French in Louisiana - enclaves that held out against the mainstream for centu-
ries - are weakening their hold; they are slowly dissolving into the new cultural
melting pot.
ff. Plural Equality
One of the main events of the twentieth century, then, is the rise of the
horizontal society. In the horizontal society, mass culture threatens to become
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universal; regional differences get flattened out. We come to live in a chain
store world - the same products, the same stores, in malls all over America.
Local color disappears.
Paradoxically, however, the same forces that bind the country together
culturally also permit the formation of interest groups that smash the mirror
of unity. The horizontal society fosters a new, different concept of equality -
one on top of the old ideology of political and economic equality. Plural
equality is the rejection of anglo-conformity and assimilation. Plural equality
is the idea that there is not or ought not to be a single, dominant group - no
single, dominant religion, culture, gender, race or way of life. It means dis-
mantling old assumptions and old prejudices. And to an astonishing degree,
"diversity ' in public life has become a reality. John F. Kennedy, a Catholic,
was elected President. At one time that would have been unthinkable. Jews
serve in the Senate and in the cabinet; in 2000, Joseph Lieberman, who is
Jewish, was nominated for Vice President. Blacks are in the Cabinet and on
the Supreme Court. Public schools are no longer thinly disguised Protestant
schools, so drenched with sectarianism that they in fact drove Catholics out,
and led them to create their own school systems. The public schools today try
to be non-sectarian. They make their nod toward Chanukkah, Kwanzaa, and
Ramadan. They are eager to treat all races with respect - Asians, Hispanics,
Native Americans, and of course, the black minority.
Where does plural equality come from? Many people might find this a
peculiar, even puzzling question. They take plural equality for granted. Or
they think of it as some kind of inevitable development, something that was
immanent in the constitutional system, in the ideals of the founding fathers,
or the like. But of course this is not at all the case. Plural equality is a spe-
cial, unique political and cultural development; nobody a century ago could
have or would have predicted it.
I think that plural equality is, essentially, a form of individualism. I think
it is culturally related to the idea of self-realization, the glorification of the
self. It reflects the notion that each human being is unique and that the main
job of a person is to develop that uniqueness.4 ' This idea, too, is a reflex of
the horizontal society. It is a message which, above all, the mass media carry,
particularly television. They preach the gospel or ideology of consumption
and self-realization. They spread far and wide an image of life made up of
endless possibilities. They also display a world of wealth, glamor and fun.
They subordinate everything else to entertainment, to immediacy.49 Televi-
sion is a "speed-of-light medium, a present-centered medium"; it packages in-
48. Forthis concept, expressive individualism, see ROBERTBEIAHET AL., HABrrs OF Tf
HEART: INDIVIDuAuSM AND COmmmENT iNAMmRICAN LIPE 32-35 (1985).
49. NELPOSTANAMUSiNGOuRSELVESTODEAT PuBUcDisCOURSEiNTHEAGEOF
SHOW BusNmss 136,141 (1985).
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formation, religion, everything else as entertainment."0 It subordinates every-
thing to the image, and that image is an image of buying and selling, an image
of pleasure and self-realization.
The societies of the developed world are relatively rich societies. The
average person lives far above the subsistence level. There is money jingling
in the average person's pocket. There is also time. Life is no longer so harsh,
so demanding; there are evenings, weekends, holidays, and vacations. There
is, in short, leisure time; and the leisure has to be filled somehow. What fills
it is fun and consumption: buying and enjoying and doing. Part of the ideol-
ogy of the old order was hard work, thrift, and moderation in all things -
moderation in drink, moderation in sex, pleasure, and so on. In fact, the rich
never paid attention to this ideology, the poor followed it, in the main, be-
cause they had to. They had neither time nor money for frills; life was hard,
a struggle for existence, for bread to put on the table, and for a roof to keep
out the rain. Wealth released people from the tyranny of endless work, and
the media helped them fill the vacuum with pleasure - with entertainment,
which often translated into activities once defined as vice. There was a time,
after all, when even baseball on Sunday was illegal.
A culture of self-realization, ofindividualism, a culture that puts the self-
and the enjoying self, the consuming self at that - at the center ofthe world, is
inherently inconsistent with traditional morality; especially those aspects of
traditional morality that emphasized modesty, moderation, doing nothing in
excess, saving money for the future, and soon. Of course, you can decide, and
many do, to keep to this old faith; but millions of people choose not to. For
them, there is nothing immoral in what used to be called "victimless crimes."
Obviously, pleasure and vice are not novelties ofthe late twentieth century, but
they are much less strictly controlled. At one time, the old morality had a tight
grip on life; there were, to be sure, carnival times and holidays, when people
could legitimately let themselves go. They were the exceptions. In the new
world of leisure time, carnival is all year round.
There would seem to be, on the surface, little connection between the
shallow hedonism preached by television, and the noble morality of, for
example, the civil rights movement. But both are products of the horizontal
society; both are reflections of a culture of the self, of individualism, of the
breakdown of old forms of cultural dominance. Both are roughly contempora-
neous. In the last half of the twentieth century, at the same time that the old
morality sputtered to defeat, legally and socially speaking - the period of Las
Vegas and Atlantic City, of decriminalization of consensual sex, of cohabita-
tion, and of gay rights - plural equality surged to impressive victories in poli-
tics and legal life. Suppressed minorities demanded equality in every sphere.
50. Id. at 136.
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Congress and the states passed vital civil rights laws. Legal segregation was
ended in the South. A strong voting rights law transformed politics and gave
blacks a voice and a share ofauthority. Of course, race still remains aburning
issue in American life. But white supremacy has suffered one stunning defeat
after another, most notably in public life. The idea of plural equality lies
behind all the great liberation movements, not just civil rights. It is the guiding
star of feminism, the Native American movement (and movements of Aborigi-
nes, First Nations, indigenous peoples, and similar groups), the revolt of the so-
called sexual minorities, the Gray Panthers, students' rights, prisoners' rights,
the rights of aliens, illegitimate children, people with disabilities, and many
other groups. The "nation!' now has to contend with all the sub-nations: the
race nations, the nation of women, the nation ofthe deaf, the nation ofthe old,
the Hispanic nation, the gay nation, and the Asian nation. Each of these
nations now claims the same autonomy, rights, and privileges once accorded
primarily to the majority nation.
In the process, the legal system, reflecting the greater social currents, was
thoroughly revamped, revised, rethought, and reconstituted. This occurred in
every field, including constitutional law, though not a hair of the text was
changed. The Supreme Court forged doctrine after doctrine, in response to the
demands of plural equality. Take, for example, the school prayer cases. The
Supreme Court struck downthe practice ofreciting prayers in public schools."'
Bible reading in the schools also fell under the ban.52 The public does not like
the prayer and Bible decisions and probably does not really understand them.
What could possibly be wrong with innocent, non-sectarian prayer? Lawyers,
for the most part, probably have a much better opinion of these cases. They
understand that the justices were not against prayer or Bible reading as such;
they simply realized that plural equality has made it impossible to devise any
form of prayer or Bible reading acceptable to all ofthe nations - including the
nation of non-believers. Protestant majoritarianism is no longer a viable
approach.n3
Ideals of self-realization also doomed the attitudes expressed in the Red
Kimono case and in movie censorship. In the second half of the century,
51. The key case concerned the so-called Regent's Prayer in New York State. See Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,424 (1962).
52. Seh. Dist. ofAbington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,205 (1963).
53. On the relative acceptance by the public, leaders, and lawyers of various issues of civil
rights and civil liberties, see HERBERTMCCLOSKY&AiDABRLDIMENSiONS OF TOLERANCE:
WHATAmRCANS BEUE ABOUTCIVILLIBERTEs (1983). Those who understood the prob-
lems of accommodating all the "nations" show greater tolerance for dissent So, for example, in
one survey, 53% of the public felt that atheists should not be allowed to "make fun of God and
religion" in "a public place where religious groups gather," but only 30% of "community leaders"
thought so, and only 15% of the "legal elite" thought so. Even so, a plurality of the mass public
favored the "freedom ofatheists to make fun of Ood and religion" in general. Id. at 131.
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traditional assumptions and norms of respectability found themselves under
siege. In the end, they were discarded. On the one hand, the old concept of
"privacy" is almost dead. Privacy, in the sense of a right to keep dirty secrets
under cover - including dirty secrets of sex, of dark drives and of desires - is
no longer a strong legal value. The Red Kimono case would have a different
outcome today. Gabrielle, under such cases as New York Times v. Sullivan 4
and its progeny, would be classified as a public figure, if only because she was
involved in a sensational trial. The public would have a right to know all about
her, just as it has a right to know about politicians, movie stars, athletes - and
notorious criminals.
On the other hand, the right ofprivacy has morphed into something quite
different. In the cases that followed Griswold v. Connecticut, a "right of
privacy" emerged which, as has been often pointed out, is entirely different
from the privacy right inthe law oftorts.56 The constitutional right is the right
to choose, freely and openly, one's own private life. Private life does not
mean "private" in the sense of secret or undercover. There is nothing "pri-
vate" about the sale of contraceptives in drug-stores, about a gay-pride march,
about two celebrity women who announce they are lovers, about the huge
mass of unmarried people who choose to live together without getting mar-
ried, and so on. But they are private in the same way that private property is
private: There are definite boundaries, and a kind of invisible sign has been
posted, telling the state, the government, the criminal justice system, and nosy
neighbors - Stay out. There is no public compulsion to conform, no legal con-
dennation of non-conformers.
As the elite attitudes underlying the censorship cases vanished, so did
censorship itself. Inthe movies today almost anything goes (slightly less so for
television). Pornography is freely available in most large cities, and in many
small ones too. Sunday laws are largely a memory. Aduheiyhas been decrimi-
nalized almost everywhere. Gambling is open and notorious. What began in
Las Vegas and Atlantic City is now almost universal. Most states have lotter-
ies, and riverboat casinos cruise up and down the Mississippi. The moral
monopoly is only a memory. Of course, every step of the way has been con-
tested. Every step is still contested, Millions of good people are appalled at
this or that aspect of contemporary life: the sex, the hedonism, the emptiness.
54. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court in Sullivan, as is well known, ruled that no suit
brought for libel against a public official could succeed, even if the publisher failed to tell the
exact truth, unless the lie was deliberate or in "reckless disregard" of the truth. See N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-73 (1964). Later cases extended the doctrine to all public
figures, whether they were officials or not.
55. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
56. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court concluded that a state
prohibition on the use of contraceptives violated the right of marital privacy. Id. at 485-86.
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They are, however, gallantly swimming upstream, against a mighty, almost
irresistible current.
IL. Am IRight? Some Possible Objections
I have argued that legal culture in the United States has changed funda-
mentally in the last half of the twentieth century. Particularly significant have
been group movements that fought for plural equality, with considerable suc-
cess. Behind these developments, I argued, was a strong form of individualism.
And yet, the civil rights movement, and the other movements that fol-
lowed it, were concerned with rights of groups, not individuals - at least it
appears that way. Identity politics is the politics of groups. Affirmative action,
much controverted, gives bonus points to members of minority groups. Yet,
in my opinion, what seem to be group rights are really, at their core, individual
rights. Feminism means, ifnothing else, the right of each woman to choose her
own path in life: to decide to be President ofthe United States, or a big-league
umpire, or a coal miner, or, perhaps, to stay home and cook and darn socks.
Each group movement for rights, is, at base, a movement to gain for members
the right to be treated as individuals - the right to choose a life-course, free
from stereotypes and discrimination. Perhaps paradoxically, identity politics
is really the politics of self-realization; and identity politics for this reason
breaks down into the politics of individual rights.
But am I overdoing the stress on individualism? Am I claiming that every-
one marches to his own personal drummer? Isn't the reality otherwise? Aren't
we suffering from a plague of conformity, of mindless herd-behavior? Chil-
dren run in packs; they form cliques; they clump together in groups. Most
people, and especially young people, seem to be terrible conformists. They
dress the same, listen to the same music, follow the same fashions and trends.
They are, in David Riesman's phrase, "other-directed"; they have no inner
gyroscope running their lives - everything comes from the group, the pack, the
herd.57
Young people are indeed conformists; they gather in flocks like sheep,
and adults are not much better. There are few true "individualists," in the
strongest sense of the word. But all these "other-directed" sheep do have a
choice of what flock to join. Nobody talks about "conformity" in a tribal
society. Everybody there in fact conforms. Conformity to group norms is
taken for granted; there is no option to be different. Indeed, the very word, the
very concept of "conformity," belongs to our kind of society; it implies the
option not to conform, or at the very least, to pick your kind of conformity.
So, in a high school society, there are cliques and groups and divisions and
57. This, of course, is the thesis of David Riesman's famous book, THE LoNELY CRowD
(1950).
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gangs; within each, there is a large measure of conformity, but students
choose or drift towards or are recruited into one particular group.
Another apparent paradox exists: I have talked about the rise of a culture
of self-realization, a culture of choice. But many ofthe most significant affilia-
tions in our society - race, gender, ethnicity, age, sexual preference - do not,
for the most part, seem voluntary at all. Still, I would argue that they are
voluntary in one important sense. Of course, nobody can get up in the morning
and decide to be white or black or a man or a woman or a Chinese-American or
gay or straight or young instead of old; but it is possible to decide what to make
of your identity. You can decide to be militant or active, and you can decide to
ignore this or that aspect of the self. You can certainly decide which aspect of
your identity to put in first place. Suppose you are a sixty year old woman, a
member of the Bahai faith, with impaired vision, and ajob as a school teacher.
You can decide which one of these labels is your central identity, the one that
really counts. Or, you can decide that none ofthem really matter and choose
something else; or you can devise your own combination. You can ignore the
way society boxes and packages you. At one time, old ladies did not ride
bicycles, black children did not aspire to become professors, people in wheel-
chairs stayed offbuses, and women had no role in the Army and Navy.
Now these are matters of choice: subjective, personal decisions. Or, to
be more accurate, they seem to be matters of choice, they seem personal and
subjective. In fact, they are, in considerable part, socially determined. To
begin with, the ideas have to be inthe air. Nobody was a feminist, as far as we
can tell, in ancient Egypt. It was not on the agenda in the age of Akhenaton, or
Charlemagne, for that matter. It is onthe agenda today. This is because of the
way the world itself has changed. Life today promotes ideas ofpersonal equal-
ity; and also furnishes ways to spread these ideas. The ideas come to individu-
als from outside; they have to be beamed into house and head. Those who
receive the messages have to be able to form affiliations. Movements like
feminism depend on a world that permits horizontal identification, and hori-
zontal affiliation.
"Choice," as I said, is meant here to convey or describe afeeling people
have about the roots oftheir own actions; but the freedom to choose is almost
always within certain limits, and those limits often are both unconscious and
quite restricted. We are nowhere near as free as we think. Everybody is a
prisoner oftime and place and culture. The average person, I am afraid, is not
much of an anthropologist or sociologist; most of us fail to understand the
customs, practices, ideologies, and mindsets of our very own tribe. If we go
into a store and buy a blue shirt, we think of this as a purely voluntary ect.
But there are only certain styles on the rack. Other styles are unavailable or
just unthinkable. If I name my new baby girl Tiffany or Brittany or call my
boy Justin or Dustin this is, I believe, absolutely my own decision. I never ask
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why all of a sudden everybody is naming children Tiffany and Brittany and
Justin and Dustin; and no longer choosing Shirley or Sandra or Irving or
Lawrence or whatever. We are manipulated by all sorts of invisible strings:
strings of our environment, strings of culture, strings that tie us to our time
and place. Most of us are completely unaware of these strings; they are as
tasteless and odorless as the air we breathe. But they exist, nonetheless, and
they can be extremely powerful.
A second point about choice: We think of choices as our own, but the
actions, thoughts, and reactions of other people in society constrain and pres-
sure our own choices. I have already argued that race, paradoxically, is in a
way an affiliation; I am born into a categorythat is defined as white or black or
some other color. I have not chosen that category, nor is the social meaning of
race inborn; it is socially constructed.58 Clearly, too, the fact that the outside
world thinks ofime as black, or Asian, or Jewish, or handicapped, has a power-
ful psychological and social effect on my modes of affiliation. An American
who comes from Haiti might think of herself as primarily Haitian; she might
have little in common with other dark-skinned people in the United States.
Haitians speak a different language, have a different religion, different customs
and foods, and so on. But most Americans fail to make these fine distinctions;
they will treat Haitians as blacks; and this fact will spur black Haitians to iden-
tify with, and even melt into, the larger black community. Chinese and Japa-
nese people, within Asia, speak different languages, have different styles of
life, and are, in fact, traditional enemies. But outside Asia, inthe United States
or elsewhere, they find themselves lumped together as "Asians" along with
Koreans and Vietnamese. People in Peru called President Alberto Fujimori "el
Chino," even though he was ethnically Japanese. But if the outside world
lumps all Asians in the diaspora into a common category, Asians themselves
may end up defining themselves as members of a "pan-ethnicity."59
The upshot of all these factors is that actions are, in general, less volun-
tary than they seem. This point should not be overdone. Within given limits,
choice is real enough. The customer does pick the shirt off the rack, and
nobody has forced him to do it; he does name his boy Justin or Dustin instead
of William or Cecil, and nobody forced him to do it. In any event, the feeling
of free choice is an incredibly significant social fact.' Most of us think of
ourselves as truly free to choose and to fashion our own lives.
58. There is, of course, alarge body ofliterature on this question - the construction of race
in America. See, for example, F. JAMES DAVIs, WHO Is BLACK? ONE NAT[ON'S DEFINITION
(1991).
59. See generally YENLE ESPIRIUASANAMERICANPANETHNIrIaY: B. GINGINSI-
TETTIONS AND IDENTIT=S (1992).
60. LAWRENCE M FRIEDMAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHoICE: LAW,AuTHOR1TY, AND CUL-
TURE (1990).
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I am aware that, in general, I have ignored elements of hierarchy, power,
authority, and the tyranny of government and large institutions. The whole
discussion has been based on an assumption that the process of self-definition
begins below, with the people themselves; this was a bottom-up perspective.
This perspective is, I think, valid and valuable, but it is obviously incomplete.
In the first place, as I noted, identity is not pure self-definition; it is also what
other people think of you, how they define you. In the second place, these
"other people" include those who hold positions of power. The tools of the
horizontal society are not just available to ordinary people. They are available
to wealth, to government, and to big institutions. These too can use tools to
mold opinion, to manipulate, to infiltrate minds. The rulers and the elites
communicate; they reach out and mobilize their populations. Genghis Khan
did not have radio and TV at his command; contemporary dictatorships do, as
do modem democracies. Modem despotism, no less than modem democracy,
depends on reaching people, on getting messages across. In contemporary
society, the interaction between those who govern and those who are governed
surely calls for a more elaborate treatment than I have given it, but that is
another, and quite complicated story.
IV Immigration: A Case Study
The shift from anglo-conformity to plural equality had a powerful impact
on every field of law, and could be illustrated in every field of law. A particu-
larly good example is the law of immigration. The United States is a so-called
"immigration" country, like Canada, Australia, and Argentina; all of these
countries, during the nineteenth century, were eager to recruit bodies from
overseas. It is usually said that there were no restrictions on immigration in
the nineteenth century in the United States, and this is basically correct.' The
first serious restrictions came at the end of the century, in the form of the
Chinese exclusion acts. The Chinese were not allowed to enter the country
(with some exceptions), and resident Chinese were not permitted to become
naturalized citizens.62 In the late nineteenth century, there was heavy immi-
gration from eastern and southern Europe, immigration which threatened to
change the demographic face of the country. In response, in 1924, Congress
enacted a very racist and restrictive immigration law. This law set up a sys-
tem of national quotas - a number which fixed how many people could enter
in any particular year, from Greece or England or Italy or Germany or wher-
61. There is a large body of literature on immigration and immigration law. For example,
see generally THOMASARCHDEACONBECOMNGAMEICAN: ANETHNIC HISTORY (1983), and
MAILDWYNAILEN ONES, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION (2d ed. 1992).
62. On this and related issues, see generally BILL ONG HING, MAKING AND REMAKING
AsiANAMmcEA THROUGH IWIGRATION POiCY, 1850-1990 (1993).
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ever. A formula, based on the census of 1890, provided the basis for the
quota. The thrust ofthe law was to restrict the number of Greeks, Italians, and
Jews, and to encourage good Protestants from northern Europe to enter the
country. Asian quotas were zero or close to zero. The underlying idea was
to protect the beleaguered majority, that is, old-line Americans.
Strangely enough, under the 1924 law, there was no western hemisphere
quota at all. This law, so worried about a flood of Greeks and Italians, in
theory allowed every last Bolivian or Panamanian who wished to come to do
so. In the case of Mexicans, of course, the demand for cheap Mexican stoop
labor was a complicating factor, but why no quota for Guatemalans or Domini-
cans?
It was certainly not because these people were welcome; they were, after
all, mostly not white and not Protestant. The most likely answer is that no-
body was worried about them. They were worried about Greeks and Italians
because Greeks and Italians were actually coming; Bolivians and Nicaraguans
were not.
Well, why not? What kept them away? For one thing, truly poor people,
and truly traditional people, do not migrate. Despite the famous phrase on the
Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor - about the tired, the poor, the huddled
masses yearning to be free - you can not be too poor or too much of a huddled
mass, or else you would lack the means to get here, orto Canada, orto Austra-
lia, in the first place. The Chinese who made Americans nervous in the nine-
teenth century were mobile, outward-looking coastal Chinese. Indeed, the fact
that there were no restrictions in 1830 or 1840 - even on the Chinese - was not
because Americans were lovers of all races; they most certainly were not. But
until travel was cheap enough, only the right sort of people were coming.
Cheap travel gave Greeks, Slavs, and Sicilians their chance to move.
Later in the twentieth century, Dominicans and Nicaraguans also found
ways to emigrate. Cheap, safe, and easy transportation was important, but the
more significant factor was culture - the culture of the horizontal society.
Travel, television, and general mobility brought the world and its messages
into small and remote villages. The media spread the global culture of con-
sumption, the culture of ambitions and desires. Traditional societies began to
disintegrate. The poor of many countries saw, on their screen, the glittering
world of El Norte; and they learned to want what they saw. As they modern-
ized, as they were absorbed into the world of consumption and self-realiza-
tion, the thought of emigrating, of leaving home, of moving to the United
States, or Canada, or Germany, or Italy, or any wealthy country, became less
distant, less alienating, less unthinkable.
The process then begins to feed on itself. Once there is a colony of
Tongans in Los Angeles, once somebody from Pakistan has a cousin in New
York, once a Jamaican has relatives in Toronto, it becomes less traumatic to
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move; there is an enclave, a neighborhood, a group, a cot to sleep on, and a
possible job washing dishes in a restaurant or mopping the floor. Still, the key
fact has been the spread of a single, converging culture. Even at the turn ofthe
century, when immigrants were primarily Europeans, one heard complaints
that immigrants were primitive, that they understood nothing of American life.
They had no idea (according to one common stereotype) what to do with a
bathtub; they used them to store coal. For new migrants, today, even migrants
from very poor countries, the way has been prepared by movies and television;
they know all about the trappings of modernity, and they want these very badly
for themselves.
Many forces combined to undermine the older, restrictive immigration
laws. Since they were based on assumptions of anglo-conformity, the rise of
plural equality knocked out this pillar oftheir power. The Second World War,
too, was a war against racism; a racist system of immigration came to seem
somewhat discordant. Moreover, the children and grandchildren ofthe Greeks
and Italians had now entered the mainstream: What was the point of discrimi-
nating against them? Besides, they had gained some political power. And,
what is often forgotten, old-line Americans had also lost the battle against
themselves - the battle to preserve their distinctive moral code. Their own
children abandoned it in droves. It survived, most powerfully, inthe American
South, inthe so-called Bible Belt; even there, it was under siege. The national
quota system was abandoned in 1965; millions ofrecent immigrants have come
from Asia and Latin America. The majority saw its share of the population
steadily shrink.
To be sure, immigration remains a controversial subject; so too does the
so-called sexual revolution, or, for that matter plural equality. Immigration
provokes nativist feelings. It generates job jealousies. It fans racist embers.
The sheer numbers involved are daunting. After all, the forces of modem
society unsettle patterns of living. They set millions of people moving -
migrating, or trying to migrate. Rich countries see migration as a cultural and
economic problem. In Europe, most notably, immigration and naturalization
laws have moved to center stage; the issue is politically explosive. In the
nineteenth century, European countries exported bodies; countless numbers
went abroad, to find their fortune inthe immigration countries. Now the shoe
is on the other foot. Millions from poorer countries are knocking on the doors
of countries like Germany, Italy, or Spain. European countries - even such
homogeneous ones as Norway or Sweden - are, in fact, becoming multicul-
tural.
Immigration creates diversity; it alters the demographic recipe. The
streets of big cities - New York, London, Rome - become rainbows of skin
color and Babels of tongues. In any event, immigration is one great source of
"multiculturalism." Yet, paradoxically, the melting pot is alive and well.
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There is, more and more, a single mass culture in the United States (and, for
that matter, to a degree, a single mass culture inthe world). As we have said,
it is a consumption culture, a culture of pleasure and entertainment. Soccer,
pizza, rock and roll are universal, or almost so. The same menu of fun and
activities is shared. Everyone shops at the same chain stores, in the same type
of mall or shopping centers. Identity groups proliferate, but the more they
proliferate, the more they are the same. In the age of plural equality, there
appear to be more choices - of identity, of life style; and more acceptance of
other peoples' choices. There is a pluralism of modalities of moral life. But
all of this takes place within a general culture that is increasingly homoge-
nized.
It is homogenized, but under the banner of plural equality. Many aspects
of the old moral code have lost much of their bite. A society of consumption
and entertainment legitimates pleasures, and takes the moral sting from
practices that were once defined as perversion or vice. Vice in fact has been
redefined - narrowed, in the main. Of course, it is far from true that today
anything goes. In fact, one can argue that the core of the moral code is still
very much alive. The classic crimes are still condemned by both law and
society. Mostly, it is the lifestyle part, the sexual part, the hedonistic part, that
has changed. And even that part ofthe code has not completely changed. But
the pallette has been broadened; colors have been added to what was once a
kind of monochrome.
V Conclusion
I have tried to show a connection between certain powerful trends in
American society, and changes in American law - connections which, on the
surface, may seem somewhat obscure. I tried to bind together modem civil
rights, the decline in traditional legal morality, and the refashioned right of
privacy, among other things. Underlying all of these trends, I argued, is a
single, huge shift in the social and legal climate, roughly dividing the first half
of the twentieth century from the second half. It is a shift from assimilation
and anglo-conformity to plural equality; from a single, dominant moral code,
to a multiplicity of codes. Complex social forces lay behind these changes:
it is enough to mention the technological revolution, the rise of the horizontal
society, advertising, the media, individualism, and the culture of the self.
My goal was not to pass judgment, but to describe and explain. Many
people disapprove of the transformations in society. To them, the moral world
seems upside down and inside out. Can anything be done? Should anything
be done? William Faulkner supposedly said that the past is not dead, it isn't
even past. Heraclitus, the ancient Greek philosopher, had a different view.
According to Heraclitus, you can't get into the same river twice. I feel that
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Heraclitus, not Faulkner, got it right. The river is not what it was yesterday, or
what it will be tomorrow. There is never any turning back. Even those move-
ments, events, and situations that seem to return to the past, that seem to be a
turn of a wheel, are nothing of the sort. There are those who hunger for tradi-
tional ways. But "radition" is often itself an invention of the present day. The
past cannot be recaptured; trying to do so involves, invariably, nothing more
than reconstitution of the present. 3 Even "fualism," paradoxically, is
essentially modern; it is, in fact, modern fundamentalism. It cannot be other-
wise. The world of the first century A.D., or ofthe seventh century, or of any
century besides the twenty-first, is gone forever and cannot be reclaimed.
The world as it is - indeed, any new state ofthe world - can seem strange
and unsettling. Change (including legal change) is rapid and universal. Old
values seem to be crumbling; indeed, some of them are crumbling. They are
replaced with new values, new norms, new ways ofthinking. It is not surpris-
ing that so many people want to cling to the wreckage of the old, vertical
society; that they seek refuge in a vision of a world that no longer exists.
In some ways, this world never did exist, at least not in the way some
people imagine it - a world of strong, noble, firm and unsullied values. The
old world was in many ways a world of bigotry and suppression. Those who
long for the good old days, for whatever reason, have simply forgotten what
the good old days were like. Imagine how few of us would really want to live
in a world without antibiotics and air conditioning, or even a world without
television or the movies. Few of us, I hope, would want to live in the world
before women voted and before African-Americans were treated as full human
beings - the world in which people aimed to destroy native languages, reli-
gions, and cultures, and in which the only good Indian was a dead Indian.
How many people today would want illegitimate children to carry a stigma for
life? How many really find ramps for people in wheelchairs offensive? How
many would like to see the Ku Klux Klan revitalized? In any event, going
back is simply not an option. Our values are the values of our times: the
values of plural equality and the horizontal society.
Values change; so do concepts of identity. At one time, the American
elite looked inside the mirror and saw nothing but the reflection of its own
smooth, shining face. But now the mirror has shattered into fragments, each
with its own separate image, its own strand of light. No one can solder the
mirror together again.
63. Onthis point, see generally THEOINvENQoFTRADrnoN (Eric Hobsbawrm& Terence
Ranger eds., 1983).
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